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Abstract 
This paper studies the problem of location-quantity choice in a duopoly in which the wage paid by each firm is set by 
the corresponding monopoly union. Compared with the outcome obtained in location-price choice game, we find that 
the wage setting choice for both unions does not change in our model, they still choose to set wage sequentially. The 
equilibrium locations are not influenced by the timing of wage setting.
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     1. Introduction
The motivation of this paper is to propose a theoretical model of spatial Cournot competition
when production costs are endogenous 1. In our model, the time when unions set wage is not
exogenously imposed but determined by the di®erent unions once both ¯rms are located and
before the stage in which ¯rms set their output. That is to say, the timing of wage setting takes
place simultaneously or sequentially.
The analysis of spatial models with Cournot competition starts with the works of Hamilton
et al.(1989) and Anderson and Neven (1991). They analyze a two-stage problem of location-
then-quantity choice in Hotelling's (1929) linear city model and ¯nd that ¯rms agglomerate at
the center of the market. Gupta et al.(1997) introduce spatial heterogeneity in the distribution
of consumers into the linear city model and show that spatial Cournot competition gives rise
to agglomeration under a wide variety of consumer distributions. Mayer (2000) considers a
model in which production costs vary across locations and con¯rms that the ¯rms may still
agglomerate. Besides, great numbers of studies have been done on spatial Cournot competition
in Hotelling's linear city model, such as multi-plant ¯rms issue (Chamorro-Rivas, 2000; Pal and
Sarkar, 2002; Yu and Lai, 2003; Li, 2006), production di®erentiation issue (Shimizu, 2002; Yu
and Lai, 2003), and economic welfare analysis (Matsumura and Shimizu, 2005a; Matsumura and
Shimizu, 2005b). However, the production costs of these papers are given exogenously. Wang
and Chen (2008) analyze the problem of location-quantity choice with endogenous production
costs in both linear and circular city model and demonstrate that the pattern of equilibrium
location varies as the transport rate increases in a linear city and ¯rms locate equidistant from
each other in circular city model. However, the wage setting process in Wang and Chen (2008)
is only simultaneous.
In the non-spatial context, Naylor (1998,1999) constructs a wage-then-quantity model in
which the monopoly union ¯rst chooses a wage and then the corresponding ¯rm sets its output
levels simultaneously. The main result of Naylor (1998) is that a more competitive product
market does not necessarily generate a more competitive labor market. Straume (2002) analyzes
the scope for collusive behavior when labor markets are unionized.
In the present paper we bring together two separate literatures: spatial Cournot competition
and wage setting. The basic spatial model in our paper is similar to Liang et al. (2006).
However, there are some di®erences between their model and ours. Firstly, the demands of
the two identical markets in the former are asymmetric while they are assumed symmetric
for convenient computation in our paper. Secondly, the production costs are exogenous and
constant in their model while they are endogenous by supposing that each ¯rm confronts a
monopoly union and wages are determined by the unions in the current paper. We attempt to
address the following two questions: (1) Is the timing of wage setting process for both unions
in location-quantity game the same with that in location-price game? (2) Does the timing of
wage setting process a®ect the location choices of ¯rms?
We ¯nd that the wage setting choices for both unions in our model are the same as the ones
in B¶ arcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2008), which are obtained in the location-then-price game
with endogenous production costs. Both unions prefer to set wages sequentially rather than
simultaneously for any pair of locations chosen by ¯rms. The timing of wage setting does not
alter the location equilibrium for the wages paid by ¯rms are independent of their locations in
our model.
1To our knowledge, it is seldom that papers in spatial competition literature consider endogenous production
costs. For exceptions see Matsumura and Matsushima (2004) where they endogenize the production cost
by introducing strategic cost-reducing activities into a Hotelling spatial model. Brekke and Straume(2004)
establish a location-price model in which ¯rms can choose their locations simultaneously or sequentially, but
always bargain over wages simultaneously. Recently, B¶ arcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2008) extend Brekke
and Straume's (2004) analysis by assuming that not only wages but also the timing of wage negotiations are
endogenous determined.
1The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. The ¯rms'
location choices are analyzed under both wage setting cases in Section 3. Section 4 compares
the outputs and pro¯ts of the two ¯rms, consumer surplus, and social welfare obtained under
the two types of wage setting respectively. Section 5 closes the paper with conclusions and
further remarks.
2. The model
There are two ¯rms, ¯rm 1 and ¯rm 2, who produce and sell a homogenous output to the
consumers who reside in two separate identical markets(market A and market B). Firms can
locate at any point along a unit length segment to set up their plants. The two markets locate
at the two endpoints of the line segment. The locations of ¯rm 1 and 2 are supposed to be
x1 and x2 apart from the left point of the line segment, respectively. Furthermore, we assume
0 · x1 · x2 · 1 without of loss generality. It implies that ¯rm 1 locates to the left of ¯rm 2.
We suppose that all the workers employed by each ¯rm are supplied by the corresponding
monopoly labor union which has the objective of rent maximization. Furthermore, we suppose
that each union negotiates with its corresponding ¯rm over wages and has completely bargaining
power. And the ¯rm has the right to choose the employment level. The unions' competitive or
reservation wage levels are assumed to be equal, and are, without loss of generality, normalized
to zero. The two ¯rms have identical technology and use one unit of labor force can produce
one unit of output. To ship a unit of the product from its own location xi to a consumer at
point x, each ¯rm i(i = 1;2) has to pay a linear transport cost tjx ¡ xij, where t is a positive
constant. We also assume that the inverse demand functions in market A and B are linear and
are respectively expressed as follows: 2
pA = a ¡ qA;
pB = a ¡ qB;
(1)
where qj (j = A;B) denotes the total quantity in market j supplied by the two ¯rms and pj
denotes delivered price in market j. Finally, t < 10
29a is assumed in order to ensure both markets
will be served by the two ¯rms.3 Given the locations and quantities of the two ¯rms and the
wages paid by both ¯rms, the pro¯t function of ¯rm i(i = 1;2) is expressed as:
¼i(x1;x2) = (pA ¡ wi ¡ txi)q
i




j (j = A;B;i = 1;2) are ¯rm i's sales in market j. It is obviously that the quantities of
market j supplied by the two ¯rms satisfy the condition qj = q1
j + q2
j.
The timing of the game in this paper consists of four stages. In the ¯rst stage, the two ¯rms
simultaneous select their locations. In the second stage, it is simultaneously decided whether
to negotiate over wages in period 1 or in period 2 given the location choice. The decision could
be taken by the unions or by the ¯rms. If the decisions of wage take place in the same period,
wage setting process is simultaneous. If not, decisions of wage are sequential. The monopoly
unions choose wages of workers in stage three. The ¯rms simultaneously choose their quantities
in the fourth stage. The game equilibrium of the model is solved by backward induction from
the last stage.
3. Equilibrium analysis
2The demand curves of both markets in the current paper are special cases of Naylor (1998). However, the
results obtained in our paper also remain valid by using the demand functions in Naylor (1998).
3It implies that the quantity of each market served by each ¯rm is positive for any pair of the two ¯rms'
locations. The inequality of t < 10
29a derives from Eqs. (9)-(10) and (14)-(15). Speci¯cally, if wage setting
process is simultaneous, from Eqs. (9)-(10), we have a ¡ 1
6(2a ¡ t) ¡ 2t > 0, which implies t < 4
11a. Similar to
simultaneous case, if wage setting process is sequential, the fact that a¡ 3
16(2a¡t)¡2t > 0 results to t < 10
29a,
and the fact that a ¡ 9
56(2a ¡ t) ¡ 2t > 0 results to t < 38
103a. In order to ensure all conditions are satis¯ed, we
have t < 10





In the present stage, ¯rms simultaneously set their output to maximize their own pro¯ts
given locations x1 and x2, wages w1 and w2, and the rival's output. Calculating the ¯rst-order
derivative of ¼i(x1;x2) with respect to qi
j, and solving these ¯rst-order conditions, we derive the
following equilibrium outcomes: 4
q
1
A = (a ¡ 2w1 + w2 ¡ 2tx1 + tx2)=3;
q
2
A = (a ¡ 2w2 + w1 ¡ 2tx2 + tx1)=3;
q
1
B = [a ¡ 2w1 + w2 ¡ 2t(1 ¡ x1) + t(1 ¡ x2)]=3;
q
2
B = [a ¡ 2w2 + w1 ¡ 2t(1 ¡ x2) + t(1 ¡ x1)]=3:
(3)
Eq. (3) indicates, as expected, that ¯rm i's sales in market j increase as its location becomes
closer to the market and are decreasing functions of its wage and increasing functions of the
competitor's wage. We can derive the delivered prices by substituting Eq. (3) into Eq. (1):
pA = (a + w1 + w2 + tx1 + tx2)=3;
pB = [a + w1 + w2 + t(1 ¡ x1) + t(1 ¡ x2)]=3:
(4)
Therefore, the delivered price of market j increases not only with its own wage and with the
wage paid by its competitor, but also with the distance between ¯rm i's location and the market.
3.2. Wage setting
We now turn to the third stage of the game. There are two choices for both unions when
setting wages. One is the simultaneous case, the other is the sequential case.
3.2.1. Simultaneous wage setting
Let wC
i (i = 1;2) denote the equilibrium wages in the case of simultaneous wage setting. 5
In this stage, each union chooses a wage taking as given the wage set by the other union and
taking into account the ¯rm's labor demand function. Hence, union i's (i = 1;2) utility can be
written as:
























Substituting (3) into (6), we obtain
w
C

















;i;k = 1;2;i 6= k; (7)
where wC
k denotes the wage chosen by union k and which union i takes as given.
From Eq. (7), calculating the ¯rst-order derivative of UC
i with respect to wC
i and union i's






(2a ¡ t + 2w
C
k ); i;k = 1;2;i 6= k: (8)
4It is easy to verify that the second order conditions are satis¯ed.
5For convenient expression, we let the superscript C stands for the results in the case of simultaneous wage
setting and the superscript F stands for the follower and L for the leader in the case of sequential wage setting
in the rest of the paper.








(2a ¡ t): (9)
Eq. (9) shows that the wages paid by each ¯rm are equal and are independent of locations
of the two ¯rms.
From Eq. (9), we can substitute back into the labor demand functions Eq. (3) to derive the
levels of the output and employment. Further substitution into Eqs. (2) and (5) then yields












































































3.2.2. Sequential wage setting
We now turn to the case of sequential wage setting and suppose that union 1 sets wages ¯rst,
without loss of generality. Thus, union 1 acts as a leader and union 2 acts as a follower.
Union 2 will choose w2 to maximize its utility taking as given the wages w1 set by union 1.
By solving the ¯rst-order condition for union 2, we ¯nd that this union's best response function
to be expressed as:
w2 = (2a ¡ t + 2w1)=8: (13)
As usual, Eq. (13) indicates that wages are strategic complements. That is to say, the greater
the wage of the rival the greater the own wage is.
Inserting Eq. (13) into the utility function of union 1 and solving the ¯rst-order condition,
the equilibrium wages wL
1;wF











(2a ¡ t): (14)
Eq. (14) indicates that the wages set by the unions are also independent of locations of the
two ¯rms in the case of sequential wage setting. However, they are unequal.
The computational processes in this subsection are similar to the ones in the case of simulta-
neous wage setting. So, we can easily obtain the equilibrium levels for pro¯ts and union utility

















































































3.3. Timing of wage setting
In the present stage of the game, we will investigate the problem that whether to choose
wages simultaneously or sequentially for the two unions.
We have the following propositions by comparing the equilibrium values stated in Eqs. (9)-
(12) and (14)-(18).
Proposition 1 For any pair of locations x1 and x2, the wages set by the monopoly unions in





This proposition shows that the wages paid by the two ¯rms in the sequential case are higher
than those in the simultaneous case in spite of the locations of ¯rms. 6 We also obtain from
proposition 1 that both unions will set equal levels for wages in the simultaneous case and the
leader union will choose a higher wage than the follower in the sequential case.
Proposition 2 For any pair of locations x1 and x2, the utility of unions in both wage setting





Proposition 2 illustrates that the utility of the two unions in the sequential case is higher
than that in the simultaneous case regardless of the locations of ¯rms. We also obtain from
this proposition that both unions get equal utility in the simultaneous case and the follower
union gains a higher utility than the leader in the sequential case.
An intuitive explanation behind Proposition 2 is as follows. The levels for wages and em-
ployments are the two factors that determine the utility of unions. From proposition 1, we
conclude that the workers employed by the two ¯rms obtain higher wages in the sequential case
than those in the simultaneous case. Moreover, the follower union can obtain more employ-
ment in the sequential case. Although the leader union supplies ¯rm 1 with less workers in the
sequential case, the higher wage implies that the greater utility obtained by the leader union
under sequential wage setting. Therefore, both unions obtain greater utility in the sequential
case than in the simultaneous case. Furthermore, the workers supplied by the follower union
are more than those supplied by the leader union in the sequential case. The follower union
obtains greater utility than the leader union although a higher wage set by the latter. Hence,
both unions prefer to choose wages sequentially rather than simultaneously.
We can directly derive the following proposition from proposition 2.
Proposition 3 Sequential wage setting is better than simultaneous wage setting for both
unions regardless of the locations of the two ¯rms.
Proposition 3 indicates that if the negotiation process is taken by the two unions, the better
timing of wage setting is sequential.
6This result is standard in the literature on wage bargaining.
5B¶ arcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2008) also obtained the result that both unions prefer to
negotiate over wages sequentially rather than simultaneously. However, our model di®ers from
their's in the following aspect: they consider the problem of location-price choice with en-
dogenous production costs while we consider the problem of location-quantity choice when
production costs are endogenous.
Comparing the equilibrium pro¯ts of the two ¯rms in the simultaneous and sequential cases,
we straightforwardly obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 For any pair of locations x1 and x2, the pro¯ts of ¯rms in both cases are





Proposition 4 can be explained as follows. From proposition 1, we know that both the
leader and the follower ¯rms pay for higher wages under sequential wage setting than when
wage setting is simultaneous. However, both the price-cost margin and the output in the two
markets obtained by the leader ¯rm in sequential wage setting case are lower than those in
simultaneous wage setting case, which leads to the result ¼C
1 > ¼L
1 . On the other hand, both
the price-cost margin and the output in the two markets obtained by the follower ¯rm in
sequential wage setting case are higher than those in simultaneous wage setting case, which
leads to the result ¼F
2 > ¼C
2 .
If the negotiation process is determined by the two ¯rms, proposition 4 indicates that the
leader(follower) ¯rm obtains lower(higher) pro¯ts than in the simultaneous case. Hence, each
¯rm wants to be the follower which results that the wage setting process is simultaneous in this
stage.
3.4. Location choice
In the ¯rst stage of the game, each ¯rm chooses a location to maximize its pro¯ts given the
competitor's location. We want to investigate whether the equilibrium locations of ¯rms' are
in°uenced by the timing of the wage setting in this section.
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 In the location-quantity choice game with endogenous production costs, there
exists one unique equilibrium, where the two ¯rms locate at the opposite endpoints of the line
segment. Moreover, the equilibrium locations are independent of the timing of endogenous
wage setting.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The intuitive explanation behind this proposition is as follows. It is the market share e®ect,
production costs e®ect and the competition e®ect that are the three factors that determine the
¯rms' optimal locations. However, the total quantity of the two markets sold by each ¯rm are
independent of ¯rms' location choice in our model. Although the wages paid by the two ¯rms
are di®erent in both simultaneous and sequential wage setting, they are also not a®ected by
¯rms' location choice in the current paper. Therefore, both ¯rms always choose their locations
at the opposite endpoints markets in order to mitigate competition regardless of the timing of
endogenous wage setting.
4. Comparison of the equilibria
We know from above section that the two ¯rms will never locate in the same market whether the
unions choose wages simultaneously or sequentially. Therefore, we can compare the di®erences
in pro¯t and outputs of the two ¯rms, consumer surplus and social welfare of the two markets
in each type of wage setting case.
We have the following propositions.
6Proposition 6 Given the equilibrium locations of both ¯rms, both ¯rms have equal outputs
and obtain equal pro¯ts in the two market if wage setting is simultaneous while the follower
¯rm has more outputs and obtains higher pro¯ts than those gained by the leader ¯rm if wage
setting is sequential.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The consumer surplus functions of the two markets in simultaneous and sequential wage



















The social welfare is de¯ned as the sum of the producer surplus, consumer surplus and unions'
utility. Hence, the social welfare in the two markets are respectively expressed as:
WA = ¼1 + CSA + U1;
WB = ¼2 + CSB + U2:
(21)
Therefore, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Given the equilibrium locations of both ¯rms, the consumer surplus of two
markets are equal respectively in both wage setting cases. Moreover, the social welfare of the
two markets are equal if wage setting is simultaneous while the social welfare of the market
where the follower ¯rm locates in is higher than that of the market where the leader ¯rm locates
in.
Proof: See the Appendix.
5. Conclusions and further remarks
In this paper, we contribute to the literature of spatial Cournot competition by considering
timing of endogenous wage setting in the location-quantity choice game with endogenous pro-
duction costs. We show that both the monopoly unions obtain higher utility in sequential wage
setting case than in simultaneous wage setting case regardless of the ¯rms' locations. This is
due to the fact that the wages paid by ¯rms are independent of their location choices in our
model. We ¯nd that both ¯rms always locate at the endpoints of the line segment whether
the wage setting is simultaneous or sequential. If wage setting process is simultaneous, both
¯rms have equal outputs and gain equal pro¯ts, and the social welfare of the two markets is
also equal. However, if wage setting process is sequential, the leader ¯rm has less outputs and
gains lower pro¯ts than those gained by the follower ¯rm, and the social welfare of the market
where the leader ¯rm locates in is lower than that of the market where the follower ¯rm locates
in. The consumer surplus of the two markets is equal respectively in both simultaneous and
sequential wage setting cases.
As a ¯nal note, there are a number of obvious directions for further work. For example, we
can apply our theoretical framework to the standard models: i.e. Hotelling's linear city model
and Salop's circular city model. It is worth pointing out that the wages paid by ¯rms are
also independent of their locations in Salop's circular city model from Wang and Chen (2008).
Hence, we can conclude that ¯rms locate equidistant from each other regardless of the timing
of wage setting. In order to obtain general results, another way to extend our paper would be
to relax the assumption that the unions have completely bargaining strength. The ¯rms may
have relative strength when they negotiate with the unions. Therefore, it is reasonable that we
should use the Nash bargaining function in the wage negotiation stage of the game.
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8Appendix
Proof of proposition 5
(1) Location choice with simultaneous wage setting
Calculating the ¯rst-order and the second-order derivatives of each ¯rm's pro¯t function
¼C











































Eq. (22) indicates that the pro¯t function of each ¯rm is strictly convex with respect to its
location xi. Hence, there exists a corner solution for each ¯rm's function. So we conclude that
the equilibrium locations for ¯rms can be derived by comparing the pro¯ts at the market A
and B.
Given the assumption of 0 · x1 · x2 · 1, there are only three possible solutions for the two
¯rms, i.e., (x1;x2) = (0;0); (x1;x2) = (0;1); (x1;x2) = (1;1). However, the last candidate can
be ruled out by the following condition:
¼
C
1 (1;1) ¡ ¼
C




2 < 0: (23)
Eq. (23) illustrates that ¯rm 1 can earn a higher pro¯t to locate in market A than in market
B, given ¯rm 2 locate in market B.
Therefore, we can obtain the exact equilibrium locations for ¯rms by comparing the pro¯ts
of ¯rm 2 at the two markets given ¯rm 1 to stay in market A.
¼
C






2 > 0: (24)
Eq. (24) shows that the best choice for ¯rm 2 to locate in market B given ¯rm 1 locate in
market A. So, we can obtain the following result from Eq. (23) and (24).
Result 1 In the location-quantity choice game with simultaneous wage setting, the two ¯rms
always locate at the opposite endpoints of the line segment.
(2) Location choice with sequential wage setting
The analysis in this section is similar to the case of simultaneous wage setting. First, the
¯rst-order and the second-order derivatives of ¯rms' pro¯t functions stated in Eqs. (15) and










































Hence, the pro¯t function of each ¯rm is strictly convex with respect to its location and
there also exist three possible solutions for both the ¯rms, i.e., (x1;x2) = (0;0); (x1;x2) =
(0;1); (x1;x2) = (1;1).




1 (1;1) ¡ ¼
L




2 < 0: (26)
9Thirdly, the optimal locations can be derived by comparing the pro¯ts of ¯rm 2 at the two
markets should ¯rm 1 locate in market A:
¼
F






2 > 0: (27)
Therefore, the following result can be straitly obtained by Eq. (26) and (27).
Result 2 In the location-quantity choice game with sequential wage setting, both ¯rms will
choose the opposite endpoints of the line segment as their optimal locations.
Result 1 and result 2 yield proposition 5.
Proof of proposition 6












(2a ¡ t): (28)









B ) = ¡
1
56
(2a ¡ t) < 0: (29)
Substituting the equilibrium locations x1 = 0;x2 = 1 into Eqs. (10)-(11) and (15)-(16), the
total pro¯ts of both ¯rms gained from markets A and B under simultaneous wage setting and





























































From Eq. (31), we have ¼L
1 < ¼F
2 for 0 < 9
56(2a ¡ t) < 3
16(2a ¡ t) and a > 0;t < 10
29a.
Proof of proposition 7
Using (12), (17)-(21) and (30)-(31), we can get the social welfare expressions of each market

























2 ¡ 9916at + 16591t
2):
(32)









2 < 0: (33)
The inequality of (33) derives from the assumptions of 0 < t < 10
29a and a > 0.
10